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The literature on agglomeration has mainly studied the impact of urbanization economies (i.e., the
externalities arising from the level of cities' economic activities as a whole but external to specic
industries)1 on rms rather than on entrepreneurs. According to the theory, urbanization external-
ities encourage rm location in the most densely populated markets, where productivity is highest
(see, for instance, Ciccone and Hall (1996), Ciccone (2002) and Moomaw, 1983), the expected qual-
ity of employer-employee match is best (Helsley and Strange (1990), Kim, 1990), search costs per
worker are lowest (Wheeler, 2001), and learning, the diusion of technological spillovers and the
acquisition of entrepreneurial capabilities are fastest (see Guiso and Schivardi (2007) and Rosenthal
and Strange (2004) for a review of the literature). However, after a certain threshold congestion
dis-externalities prevail over agglomeration economies, and some sort of selection into the densest
markets is needed. Firms might be selected on the basis of their order of arrival (e.g., Helsley
and Strange, 1990), productivity (like in Behrens and Robert-Nicoud, 2008), Darwinian selection
(Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008), the extent they benet from forward-backward linkages (Baldwin
and Okubo, 2006), or simply on the basis of their sector (Henderson (1983), LaFountain, 2005).
In contrast to the majority of the agglomeration literature, we estimate urbanization eects
on entrepreneurs rather than rms or employees. In particular, we examine whether population
density in the individual's province of work increases the probability of being an entrepreneur and/or
creates urban dierentials in the returns to entrepreneurship. While rm type (e.g., sector, size,
etc.) is certainly a determinant of location, as some sectors depend more on scale, urban amenities
and local endowment of natural resources than others, entrepreneurs' characteristics (e.g., ability,
education, experience, age) may also matter.
To this purpose we use a unique data set provided by the Italian National Institute of Statistics
(ISTAT), examining college-to-work transitions three years after graduation. Although college
graduates represent just about 11 percent of Italian entrepreneurs, using this data source has the
advantage of providing a homogeneous sample of individuals facing similar work choices (i.e., college
graduates at the same stage of the life-cycle). Moreover, focusing on college graduates minimizes the
probability of including 'out of necessity' entrepreneurs in our sample, since the individuals choosing
self-employment because of lack of outside options are generally the least educated workers (the
'ability-bias' hypothesis). Several studies have shown that the ability-bias can be quite important:
in the US, for instance, up to 10 percent of the entrepreneurs becomes such because of lack of
suitable alternatives rather than in order to pursue an opportunity (see Poschke (2008), Lazear,
2005). Another advantage of our data set is that the limited mobility of labour in Italy reduces the
likelihood that our urbanization estimates are biased by sorting into the most densely populated
1 As opposed to localization economies, internal to each industry (Henderson, 1983).
1provinces (i.e., entrepreneurs with unobserved characteristics correlated to work choices moving
into the most densely populated markets). Indeed, according to ISTAT (ISTAT, 2003) in Italy
more than 80 percent of individuals with alive parents lives in the same municipality as their
mothers' or fathers', about 7 percent of the people resides in a municipality within 16 kilometres
from their parents', and only 8:2 percent of the citizens lives abroad or at a distance greater than
50 kilometres. Besides cultural reasons (see, for instance, Alesina et al., 2010), the strong family
ties in Italy are due to the lack of a good welfare system, leaving parental care largely to ospring
and child care to grandparents. However, entrepreneurs have further reasons to live close to their
place of origin, as they might be willing to exploit the local family networks to start their business
(personal contacts and customer base). Michelacci and Silva (2007), for instance, show both that
in Italy and the US entrepreneurs are more likely to obtain bank credit when the rm is local and
that the probability of working in the province of birth is higher for entrepreneurs (whether or not
start-ups) than for employees. This result is in line with Blanchower (2000), who nds that in
most OECD countries self-employed workers are less willing to move from their neighbourhood,
town or region than employees. In particular, Italy is the OECD country among the 23 analysed in
his paper with the least willing-to-move self-employed individuals. In Italy mobility is surprisingly
limited also among students, who are generally one of the most mobile segment of the population,
even in the areas endowed with low-quality universities (e.g., the South). Indeed, according to
Brunello and Cappellari (2008) almost three quarters of the Southern students graduates in the
South, but just 8 percent (20 percent) of them moves the North (Centre), in spite of the fact that
individuals graduating in a Northern faculty earn higher employment-weighted wages than those
graduating in a Southern faculty.2
We dene 'entrepreneurs' all the individuals who either describe themselves as such or as mem-
bers of the arts and professions during the interview (see Section 2 for further details). Contrary
to the predictions of the literature on agglomeration, we nd that, other things being equal, three
years after graduation college graduates are more likely to start an activity of their own in the least
than in the most densely populated provinces. In particular, doubling the province of work's popu-
lation density reduces the probability of being an entrepreneur by about 2-3 percentage points. This
penalty persists after instrumenting urbanization with population density in 1921. We then inves-
tigate whether our nding can be explained by across-province dierentials in competition, urban
amenities and dis-amenities, labour costs, outside options, unemployment rates, and value added
per capita. Our results indicate that overall these province characteristics account for more than
half of the negative urbanization eect. Finally, we investigate whether the sign of our urbanization
outcome can be explained by the presence of negative dierentials in returns to entrepreneurship
2 The authors ascribe the low student mobility to North-South cost dierentials (university fees, rents, etc.), rather
than to the existence of nancial constraints. According to Makovec (2006), Southerners graduating in the North
earn 25 percent more than those who stay and 6 percent more than those who move to the North after graduation.
2between the most and the least densely populated markets, similarly to Di Addario and Patacchini
(2008) and de Blasio and Di Addario (2005), who nd that the most highly educated employees
earn relatively less in the urban or industrially agglomerated areas than elsewhere in Italy, in con-
trast to the least educated workers. In fact, we nd that returns to entrepreneurship increase with
population density: the elasticity of young entrepreneurs' net monthly earnings with respect to the
province of work's population density is 0:02-0:03.
This last result, in line with the literature, predicting that agglomeration externalities increase
productivity in the most densely populated markets (for evidence on Italy see, for instance, Cingano
and Schivardi (2004) and Guiso and Schivardi, forthcoming), poses an apparent puzzle: why is it
less likely to become entrepreneurs in the densest provinces, given that returns to entrepreneurship
increase with population density? A possible explanation of this puzzling result is that the least
densely populated markets easy entrepreneurship by reducing the costs of rm setting up. Indeed,
we nd that the presence of local banks, inversely correlated with population density, increases
the likelihood of becoming entrepreneur three years after graduation, implying that entry costs are
an important determinant in young college graduates' work decisions. Conversely, we obtain that
entry into the most densely populated markets is particularly dicult for young entrepreneurs,
especially because of tougher competition.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the data and provides descriptive
statistics. Section 3 presents the econometric results and the robustness checks; Section 4 tests
alternative hypotheses potentially explaining our results; Section 5 investigates whether there are
earning dierentials, and the last one concludes.
2 The data
The main data source of this paper is the Survey on the Early Career of College Graduates (SECCG,
"Indagine sull'inserimento professionale dei laureati") conducted by ISTAT every three years. We
analyse the individuals graduated in 1995, 1998 and 2001, and interviewed, respectively, in 1998,
2001 and 2004. In the rst semester of each survey year ISTAT extracts a random sample (about
16 percent of the total) from the universe of the individuals graduating in that year, stratied on
the basis of gender, faculty and university. In the second semester ISTAT interviews the sampled
individuals by phone, double-checking all answers with universities' administrative records. Among
the Italian surveys currently available, SECCG oers the most precise and detailed information on
demographic characteristics, college attended, ability, family background, current employment and
income of recently graduated individuals. The survey also collects information on the province
of work, enabling us to compute the impact of urbanization on the probability of transition from
university into entrepreneurship. To compute the urbanization variable, we merge our data set with
the Census' population density by year of interview and province of work (the nest disaggregation
3available in the survey). Our sample is distributed in all the 103 Italian provinces. We complement
the data base with other variables at the provincial level drawn from various sources (described in
the Appendix).
Our sample, consisting of 33;740 college graduates, has been obtained after excluding: the more-
than-35 year-old individuals, foreigners, Italians working abroad, the agricultural-sector workers,
and the non-employed people. Moreover, we exclude the individuals who were already employed
in the current job before graduating because we intend to focus on work choices after graduation,
and the former might be a selected sample of the working population.
Seventeen percent of our sampled individuals is an entrepreneur (Table 1). In addition to the
individuals strictly identifying themselves as such, our denition of entrepreneur includes profes-
sionals and excludes the members of a family business, similarly to Michelacci and Silva (2007).
Indeed, like entrepreneurs, the members of the arts and professions take decisions independently
and are risk-bearing, since they are personally liable for their business activity. Conversely, family
business members are often not involved in decision making and do not necessarily share the risk
with the rm owner. Unlike Michelacci and Silva, we exclude managers (as we do not have this
piece of information) and craftsmen, because in Italy, where the pressure of taxation and employees'
contributions is high, the recorded information on this type of self-employment category might be
measured with error for its greater facility to evade taxes. Our denition also excludes the so-called
co.co.co (free-lance workers) because they generally perform the same tasks as employees, in spite
of the fact that they are considered self-employed by ISTAT (because they have no guarantees as
payroll employees).
To analyse the dierences in our variables' distribution between the most and the least densely
populated markets, we provide the descriptive statistics for the total sample, the individuals working
in the top 10th percentile of Italian provinces' population density distribution, and those employed
in the rest of the country (Table 1). As expected, a larger share of entrepreneurs and employees
works in the most densely populated areas than elsewhere (respectively, 16 and 71 percent against
15 and 65 percent in the least dense markets), while there is no dierence in the spatial distribution
of the other categories of self-employed workers. Moreover, monthly earnings from entrepreneurship
are 10:0 percent higher in the most densely populated provinces than in the rest of the country. The
least densely populated provinces exhibit a slightly higher share of women and older people than
the densest ones. Provinces also dier with respect to the type of school attended: students choose
more frequently lyceums in the most densely populated areas, and surveyor or teacher schools in
the least dense markets. College graduates obtain higher nal grades, on average, in the least
densely populated provinces, though a higher percentage of individuals graduates on time in the
densest markets than elsewhere. The share of college graduates who hold a Ph.D. does not vary
across provinces of dierent density levels. In line with the literature, human capital-intensity
4is positively correlated with population density: the share of individuals whose parents have a
secondary education or a college degree is higher in the most than in the least densely populated
provinces, while the share of parents with a primary or middle school attainment is lower. The
densest markets also exhibit a higher share of self-employed workers' ospring than elsewhere,
suggesting that intergenerational persistence is positively correlated with population density.
With respect to the variables at the provincial level, urban dis-amenities (i.e., house prices)
and competition (i.e., the share of self-employed workers in the individual's sector) are higher in
the most densely populated markets than in the rest of the country. In contrast, but in line with
literature, the share of local banks is negatively correlated with population density. In particular,
40 percent (29 percent) of the banks in the least (most) densely populated markets is local.
3 Results
3.1 Chances of being entrepreneur
The descriptive statistics reported in Table 1 show that the percentage of recently graduated en-
trepreneurs is 1 percent higher in the most densely populated provinces than in the rest of the
country, in line with the predictions of the agglomeration theory. In this section we test empir-
ically whether this result holds after controlling for individual characteristics. In particular, we
estimate the impact of population density on the likelihood of being an entrepreneur three years
after graduation. We use a probit model and correct the standard errors for the possibility that
the residuals are inter-dependent at the provincial level (33;740 observations distributed in three
time periods over 103 provinces provides our estimations with enough degrees of freedom; see Card,
2001). Using repeated cross-sectional data, we estimate the following equation on the sample of
employed individuals:
Prob(Entreprijt = 1) =  + Xijt + DENjt + RFEj + t + uijt; (1)
where Entreprijt is a dummy variable equal to one if the individual i working in province j and
interviewed at time t is an entrepreneur; DEN is the province of work's population density (our
urbanization variable), X indicates the personal observable characteristics, t the year-of-interview
dummies, and RFE the region-specic xed eects, capturing, for instance, the impact of local
taxes or the presence of natural advantage or amenities (see Ciccone (2002) and Rosenthal and
Strange, 2003).
The rst column of Table 2 shows our basic specication, including sex, age, education, civil
status and number of siblings as individual characteristics. In the second column ((2.2)) we add the
secondary school and faculty-group attended, because some types of training are better suited for
entrepreneurship than others. In column (2.3) we include the eect of intergenerational persistence
5with two dummy variables equal to one if the individual's father and/or mother are/were self-
employed. We also add a proxy of family networks (equal to one if the individual found the job or
started his/her activity through the help of relatives or friends, zero otherwise), which might easy
access to entrepreneurship through personal and business contacts or customer base (Blanchower,
2000). In the same specication we also control for parents' education level. In column (2.4) we
add a few proxies for ability (grade obtained at college, a dummy for graduating with honours, and
a variable equal to one if the student graduated on time) and two variables denoting whether the
individual was working { occasionally or continuously { while studying. Finally, in specication
(2.5) we add individuals' work experience (number of months worked) and sector of employment,
because some industries require a larger amount of initial capital than others (see, for instance,
Rajan and Zingales, 1998).
Results indicate that doubling the province of work's population density lowers the chances
of being entrepreneur by 2-3 percentage points. This result is stable across all the specications
(columns (2.1)-(2.5)) and always signicant at the 1 percent statistical level.3
When analysing some of the other covariates, we nd that women are less likely of becoming
entrepreneurs. In contrast, age and being married increase the chances of entrepreneurship, while
having a Ph.D. degree does not have any eect. This result is not surprising because in Italy
very few college graduates enrol and complete a Ph.D. three years after graduation (just 0:2 per-
cent of our sampled individuals). Having attended the science, chemistry, humanities and foreign
languages faculties lowers the likelihood of starting an activity of one's own, while attending the
majority of the remaining colleges (e.g., engineering, architecture, agriculture, law) and vocational
schools (specialized in industrial subjects) increases it. Most importantly, we nd evidence of in-
tergenerational persistence: having a self-employed father or mother increases the probability of
becoming entrepreneur. Moreover, the family network proxy increases the chances of entrepreneur-
ship, as expected. In contrast, nal grade at college and the honour dummy are non-signicant,
while having graduated on time is signicantly positive. The non-signicance of the former might
be due to the fact that cognitive ability does not fully capture the capabilities required to become
entrepreneurs (though many empirical papers proxy entrepreneurial ability just with education;
e.g., Poschke (2008), Le (1999) and Calvo and Wellisz, 1980). Indeed, being an entrepreneur has
probably more to do with being multifaceted (i.e., well versed in various elds, able to perform
a large number of dierent tasks and manage dierent people), ecient, and well organized. Ac-
cording to the Jack-of-All-Trades entrepreneur hypothesis (see Lazear, 2005) entrepreneurship is
3 We also tested whether our results hold when measuring urbanization with the province's density of college
graduates (rather than with overall population density). Indeed, it might be the case that college graduates' produc-
tivity increases more with proximity to other highly educated workers than with vicinity to lowly skilled people (see
Rosenthal and Strange, 2008), because graduate entrepreneurs might have more to learn from nearby human capital.
Nevertheless, the results of this exercise (available on request) remain unchanged with respect to those reported in
Table 2. Thus, our ndings are not sensitive to the choice of the population of reference.
6favoured by a balanced mix of skills across various elds of expertise, which is innate rather than
acquired at school (Silva, 2007). Conversely, being able to organize one's self so as to graduate
on time is a quality better reecting the capabilities required for working as an entrepreneur than
school grade, especially in the light of the fact that in Italy most people graduate with a certain
delay (just 15 percent of the sampled individuals graduated on time; Table 1).4
3.2 The potential endogeneity problem
Our estimates of urbanization are unbiased and consistent only under the hypothesis that we have
not omitted any variable correlated to provinces' population density. Conversely, if individuals'
composition across markets of dierent density varied along unobservable dimensions that aected
the probability of being an entrepreneur, previous section's urbanization estimates would be biased
and inconsistent. In particular, the negative urbanization eect could be due (entirely or in part) to
a higher endowment of people less capable of becoming entrepreneurs in the most densely populated
markets for unobservable reasons, although this would be in contrast to the literature (e.g., Nocke,
2006).
In this section we deal with the potential endogeneity problem by instrumenting urbanization
with pre-World War II population density (in 1921), similarly to Ciccone and Hall (1996), Rice,
Patacchini and Venables (2006), Combes et al. (2008) and Guiso and Schivardi (forthcoming).
Indeed, while the population density distribution has been stable over time, its 1921 pattern should
have no direct eect on current entrepreneurship chances besides the indirect impact through
current population density.
Results are reported in Table 3. Strikingly, we obtain the same outcome as before across all the
columns (replicating Table 2's specications), showing no evidence of a systematic bias in the OLS
regressions, thus supporting our causal interpretation of urbanization.5 In particular, doubling the
province's population density reduces the probability of being an entrepreneur by 2-3 percentage
points (at the 1 percent statistical signicance level).
Table 3 also reports the rst-stage results of the instrument used, the pseudo R-squared statistic
and a measure of instrument relevance. As expected, population density in 1921 is positive and
signicant (at the 1 percent level) across all the columns. The partial R-squared statistic, measuring
the correlation between urbanization and the instruments after partialling out the eect of the other
exogenous variables, has very high values (above 0:92). The rst-stage F-statistic of the excluded
instruments, a diagnostic tool to evaluate the seriousness of the nite-sample bias and instrument
4 We are aware of the fact that the graduating-on-time eect might be aected by reverse causation (if the students
wanting to be entrepreneurs nished university in a shorter time than the others), as suggested by an anonymous
referee. However, to the extent that occupational choices are made after graduation or towards the end of college, the
graduating-on-time variable would not suer from this problem. Nevertheless, our urbanization results are robust to
excluding this variable from the regressions.
5 Note that other papers using Italian data nd that OLS and IV urbanization estimates are highly similar (e.g.,
Guiso and Schivardi (forthcoming) and Di Addario and Patacchini, 2008).
7weakness (Bound, Jaeger and Baker, 1995), always rejects the null hypothesis that our instrument
is equal to zero. Since the 2SLS and the probit estimation coecients are very similar in size and
the Hausman test can never reject the null hypothesis of no dierence between them (results not
reported but available upon request), in what follows we will refer to Table 2's results as to our
main ndings.
4 Potential explanations of the negative urbanization eect
We have showed that the probability that a college graduate becomes an entrepreneur three years
after graduation decreases with provinces' population density. This result holds after controlling for
a wide variety of individual characteristics and regional xed eects, and it is robust to correcting
for the potential endogeneity of urbanization. The lack of endogeneity is not too surprising in the
light of the fact that geographical labour mobility is particularly low in Italy, especially among
the self-employed individuals (see the Introduction). In this section we test whether the negative
impact of urbanization persists after controlling for some characteristics of the province of work
that might be correlated with population density (see Table 1). To investigate this possibility,
we add the province characteristics described below (see the Appendix for further details) to our
benchmark specication (reported in column (2.5)). Since we assume that the provincial variables
are exogenous, our approach is to be considered as purely descriptive. Results are shown in Table
4.
First, we test whether the negative urbanization dierential can be explained by the densest
markets' more intense competition (see Combes et al., 2009), which might discourage particularly
young people at the beginning of their career. Indeed, rivalry may lower rms' price-cost margins,
requiring, thus, a level of eciency that entrepreneurs might acquire only through experience. We
measure competition with the share of the individual sector's self-employed workers in total self-
employed workers (column (4.1)). As expected, the more intense is rivalry the less likely is that
college graduates become entrepreneurs. Most importantly, controlling for competition reduces the
size of the urbanization coecient by almost a third (from  0:0216 in the benchmark specication,
to  0:0151).
In the second specication ((4.2)) we test whether young college graduates are particularly dis-
couraged from starting their own activities in the most densely populated provinces because land
is most expensive, raising rms' xed set up costs. In case of credit market imperfections, the
increased diculties of nancing the extra initial investment necessary to cover the higher xed
costs in the most densely populated markets might be particularly binding for young entrepreneurs.
In the quality-of-life-framework (Roback, 1982) rms prefer locating in the most amenity-intensive
markets as long as their utility from productive urban amenities (e.g., availability of infrastructures
like airports, better-quality services, specialized schools, etc.) exceeds the dis-utility from conges-
8tion.6 Congestion may discourage more the young than the experienced entrepreneurs, because in
saturated local markets received prices might be lower than elsewhere (Henderson, 1994), increasing
the diculties of starting-up. We measure urban dis-amenities with house prices per square metre.
Introducing house prices reduces the urbanization eect (with respect to our benchmark) by just 8
percent: doubling the province's population density reduces the probability of being entrepreneur
by 2:0 percentage points.
Third, we test whether young college graduates are encouraged to start their activities in the
least densely populated markets because these are endowed with the amenities entrepreneurs most
care for. For instance, entrepreneurs might prefer locating in the provinces with a stronger culture
of entrepreneurship (Glaeser, 2007), a higher social capital or a larger presence of local banks. In
Italy, the most entrepreneurial areas, richer of social capital and civic endowment, coincide to a
large extent with the municipalities that in the Middle Ages become republics (as opposed to the
Southern monarchical regions), which are, indeed, small- and medium-sized (Putnam, 1993).7 Thus,
in column (4.3) we include ve proxies of social capital  a la Putnam (1993): number of associations
per 100;000 inhabitants, tradition of political autonomy, propensity to collective action, average
voter turnout at all Italian referenda held between 1946 and 1989, and blood donation (as in
Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2004). We also add the share of provinces' municipalities with a
city sewer system and an index of welfare (inversely related to provinces' population density),
meant to capture the fact that entrepreneurs might prefer living in the least densely populated
provinces because they oer a better quality of life. In this specication we also control for the
share of local banks' counters in total banks' counters, which is highest in the least dense markets.
Indeed, accessing external nancing might be particularly dicult for young entrepreneurs (in
spite of being at a stage of the life cycle when they need to rely more on it), because banks judge
their activity very risky (see Blanchower and Oswald, 1998). We expect this variable to have
a positive direct eect on entrepreneurship, because local banks are thought of facilitating local
entrepreneurs' start-up nancing, as they generally both have local owners and are specialized in
providing credit locally (Farabullini and Gobbi, 2000). Column (4.3) shows that the individuals
living in the provinces with a higher share of local banks have a higher probability of becoming
entrepreneurs, as expected. The only other signicantly positive amenity variable is the propensity
to collective action. Overall, urban amenities explain one fth of the urbanization eect: doubling
population density reduces the chances of entrepreneurship by 1:8 percentage points.
Fourth, we test whether young college graduates are discouraged from starting an activity of
6 However, if the amenities in the most densely populated markets were unproductive (e.g., higher number of
cinemas and theatres, greater variety of shopping centres, wider oer of sport venues, etc.), entrepreneurs would
unambiguously prefer locating in low-amenities places, where land prices are lower. In this case, only employees
would prefer living in the most densely populated provinces.
7 As the author suggests, the current economic development of Italian provinces depends more on the civic
endowment built in the Middle Ages than on their initial economic conditions, and causality runs from civics to
economics rather than the reverse.
9their own in the most densely populated markets because, on average, they have to pay a higher
cost of labour. To test this hypothesis, we add the province's average employee wage, and we
nd that it is not signicant; the urbanization eect is the same as in the benchmark specication
(column (4.4)).
Fifth, we test whether the provinces with a higher population density discourage entrepreneur-
ship because of their greater oer of a wider variety of outside options (e.g., working as employees
in the public sector, in large rms, etc.). Indeed, the densest markets are generally endowed with
a larger public sector than the least densely populated provinces, and thus have a tendency to
oer above all salaried-job opportunities, not encouraging young college graduates to start en-
trepreneurial activities.8 Conversely, the least densely populated markets, where the oer of jobs
in the public sector is more limited, might provide a higher incentive for entrepreneurship out of
necessity. Thus, in this specication we control for the log of the ratio between the province's av-
erage employee wages and the province's average earnings from entrepreneurship, to test whether
in the densest market the dierence between earnings from entrepreneurship and wages is or is not
sucient to cover the risk of starting a business activity. However, this variable is non-signicant
and, not surprisingly, the urbanization eect is the same as in column (2.5) (specication (4.5)).
Sixth, we test whether the negative urbanization dierential persists after controlling for two
proxies of local economic development: the province's unemployment rate and value added per
capita in 1994, similarly to Michelacci and Silva (2007).9 Indeed, people may decide to start an
activity of their own out of necessity not only because of a limited variety of job types oered, but
also because of low employment chances (especially in a context of low labour mobility). Thus, if
the least densely populated provinces were also the poorest, our results could be driven by sample
composition rather than by urbanization: the greater likelihood of becoming entrepreneurs in the
least densely populated markets could be due to a higher share of individuals lacking alternative
opportunities. However, specication (4.6) shows that neither unemployment rates nor value added
per capita are signicant, implying that in Italy individuals do not generally choose entrepreneurship
out of necessity, in line with Michelacci and Silva (2007). Thus, including unemployment rate and
value added per capita leaves the urbanization coecient almost unchanged with respect to our
benchmark specication ( 0:0187).
Finally, in the last specication ((4.7)) we include all the provincial variables reported in columns
(4.1)-(4.6). Results indicate that young entrepreneurs are discouraged from starting their business
in the most competitive areas, while they are encouraged by social capital endowment in the least
8 In this line, Torrini (2005) shows that in OECD countries the larger the public sector size, the lower self-
employment rates. According to the author, the public sector is likely to crowd out self-employment especially in the
general administration (where entrepreneurship does not exist) or in education and health (where the government is
typically more present).
9 Similarly to the authors, we use value added in a year preceding the labour market entrance of the rst wave
of the sampled individuals (in 1995), because this enables us to capture the eect of an exogenous variation in local
economic development on the probability of being an entrepreneur.
10densely populated markets (in particular, by the presence of local banks and people's propensity
to collective action). When considered jointly, these factors explain 55 percent of the urbanization
eect in the benchmark specication.
5 Returns to entrepreneurship
We have shown that the most densely populated is the market, the more young college graduates
are discouraged from becoming entrepreneurs. In this section we test whether this phenomenon
can be explained by the existence of monetary disincentives to entrepreneurship growing with pop-
ulation density. Indeed, other studies on Italian employees nd that college graduates are less able
than the least educated workers to reap-o the benets from agglomeration externalities (whether
urban or industrial). For instance, Di Addario and Patacchini (2008) obtain that employees with at
least a university degree earn 0:4 0:5 percent less each 100-inhabitant increase in the population of
the local labour market of residence, in spite overall average wages raise by 0:1 percent. Similarly,
according to de Blasio and Di Addario (2005) college graduates' earnings from salaried work are
9   14 percent lower in industrial districts (i.e., the local labour markets with a strong agglomera-
tion of small- and medium-sized manufacturing rms) than elsewhere in the country. Conversely,
the employees with elementary education or less earn a premium over their counterparts outside
industrial districts.
In fact, the descriptive statistics reported in Table 1 would not support the hypothesis of
negative correlation between earnings from entrepreneurship and province's population density,
because on average entrepreneurs earn about 10:0 percent more in the most densely populated
provinces than elsewhere (Table 1). Nevertheless, we examine whether this is still the case after
controlling for individuals' characteristics. In particular, we estimate a standard Mincerian earning
function (Mincer, 1958) by regressing the logarithm of entrepreneurs' monthly earnings on the
individual characteristics reported in Table 2.
Results, shown in Table 5 (Panel A), indicate that, after controlling for individual characteris-
tics, income from entrepreneurship increases with population density, in line with the predictions
of the literature. In particular, the elasticity of young educated entrepreneurs' monthly earnings
with respect to the province of work's population density is 0:02-0:03. However, OLS estimates
would be biased and inconsistent if there were omitted variables aecting both urbanization and
entrepreneurs' earnings (see Section 3.2). Thus, we re-estimate the earning equation by 2SLS, in-
strumenting urbanization with the log of province population density in 1921. Results, shown in
Table 5 (Panel B), conrm OLS ndings.
The rst-stage results, reported at the bottom of Table 5, indicate that the log of population
density in 1921 is always positive and signicant at the 1 percent level across all the columns. The
partial R-squared statistic is 0:90, and the F-statistic of the excluded instruments always rejects
11the null hypothesis that our instrument is equal to zero. Finally, the Hausman test fails to reject
the null hypothesis of no dierence between the 2SLS and the OLS coecients (results available
upon request).
Thus, our results indicate that contrary to employees, entrepreneurs do benet from urbaniza-
tion externalities in monetary terms, at least to the extent that they succeed in opening an activity
in the most densely populated markets.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we analyse empirically the eects of urbanization economies on the probability that
Italian young college graduates become entrepreneurs. We nd that doubling the province of work's
population density lowers the probability of being an entrepreneur three years after graduation by
2-3 percentage points. This result holds after controlling for regional xed eects and is robust to
instrumenting urbanization with the log of provinces' population density in 1921. Controlling for
provinces' competition, urban amenities and dis-amenities, average cost of labour, earning dier-
entials between employees and self-employed workers, and local economic development eliminates
more than half of the negative urbanization penalty.
We then test whether our results could be explained by the presence of negative dierentials
in returns to entrepreneurship between the most and the least densely populated markets. In fact,
we nd that urbanization raises entrepreneurs' income: the elasticity of their monthly earnings
with respect to population density is 0:02-0:03. Thus, young entrepreneurs are able to reap-o the
benets from urbanization externalities, provided that they succeed in entering the most densely
populated markets.
Our results are consistent with the entry cost theory: the locations with a higher share of en-
trepreneurs (i.e., the least densely populated ones) also exhibit lower individual earnings, and, thus,
productivity. In contrast, Guiso and Schivardi (forthcoming) obtain a positive correlation between
the incidence of entrepreneurs (of any age and education level) and TFP, using rm data at the
Italian local labour market level. While our nding is certainly valid for the young and highly
educated entrepreneurs, it would then be interesting to establish whether wider ranged individual
data would also conrm our result for the most experienced and the least educated entrepreneurs,
or whether urbanization externalities dier according to education and/or age. Moreover, while
we have studied the eect of market density on the probability of being an entrepreneur, indepen-
dently on whether individuals work in the province of birth, Michelacci and Silva (2007) show that
entrepreneurs generally start their activity in the region of birth, independently of its population
density. Future research could combine the two approaches to analyse if the eect of population
density on entrepreneurial choices depends on whether the individual works or not in the province
of birth.
12Finally, our results are policy-relevant. In 1995, for instance, the Italian Parliament passed
a bill (L. 95/95) providing subsidies to the young entrepreneurs (below 35 years old) residing in
the least developed regions of Italy (i.e., the South), in the rural areas or in zones in industrial
decline (the European Commission's objective 1, 2 and 5b).10 This paper shows that young college
graduates are discouraged from starting their activity in the most densely populated provinces, in
spite of the fact that they would gain a monetary premium there. It would thus be advisable to
encourage the location of start-up rms in the densest rather than in the least densely populated
markets, in order to enable young entrepreneurs, who presumably face greater diculties than
more experienced entrepreneurs, to benet from urbanization externalities. The importance of
graduates' entrepreneurship should not be undervalued, because the youngest and most highly
educated entrepreneurs might be more likely to introduce innovations than the oldest and least
educated businessmen.
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16Appendix
Description of the provincial level variables
Share of self-employed workers in the individual's sector in province's total self-employed workers.
Source: ISTAT.
House prices per square meter (in 2004). Source: Consulente Immobiliare. The prices, provided
by real estate agents, are those actually paid in transactions. We average the prices collected in
the town centres, suburbs and in-between areas to take into account the house location. We also
take into account the age of the building by averaging the prices of the recently build and the new
houses.
Share of local bank counters in the province's total bank counters (in 2001). Source: the Bank
of Italy. Local banks are the banks whose average investment funds amount to less than 9 billion
euros.
Tradition of political autonomy. Source: Isl-University of Parma. This is a dummy variable
equal to one if the province has a long-standing tradition of political autonomy (zero if the province
belonged to the Vatican State or was a monarchy before Italy's foundation).
Propensity to collective action. Source: Arrighetti, Lasagni and Serravalli (2001). This variable
has been computed with a principal-component analysis on the basis of the following variables: the
share of the craftsmen joining artisan associations in the number of artisan rms put on the register
in 1970; the ratio between the number of votes in the 1970 elections for the Artisan Provincial
Board and the number of artisans put on the register in 1970; the share of farms selling products
to agricultural cooperatives in the number of farms in 1970; the ratio between the people joining
buying associations and the number of trade licences in 1965; a dummy variable equal to one if
the province has at least one joint-surety association on bank loans joining Artigiandi that was
founded before 1975 (and zero otherwise).
Average voter turnout at all Italian referenda held in the period 1946-1989. Source: Guiso et
al.'s (2004) elaboration on data from the Italian Ministry of Interior. The referenda held in the
period considered were on the following subjects: choice between Monarchy and Republic (1946);
divorce (1974); public nancing to political parties (1978); anti-terrorism legislation and abortion
(1981); cost of living index (1985); nuclear energy and hunting regulation (1987).
Number of blood sacks donated in the province per 1 million AVIS inhabitants (in 1995). Source:
17AVIS (Italian Voluntary Association for Blood). Each bag contains 16 oz. of blood. In four
provinces (Genova, Caserta, Avellino and Caltanissetta) the value is set to zero because they do
not host AVIS and presumably have very low blood donations.
Average number of associations per 100;000 inhabitants (in 1985). Source: Isl-University of
Parma. This variable has been computed by subtracting the sporting and interest agencies' asso-
ciations from the total. The municipal tourist boards associations are instead included.
Share of provinces' municipalities with a city sewer system. Source: ISTAT.
Welfare index. Source: Il Sole 24 Ore. The index, named Gross Domestic Welfare, is a com-
bination of 8 variables at the provincial level: value added per inhabitant at current prices, life
expectation at birth, enrolment rate at college, per-capita expenditure for entertainment, partici-
pation to European elections in 2009, tons of CO2 in real value added, number of thefts, burglaries,
and murders per 100;000 inhabitants, number of voluntary work associations per 1;000 inhabitants.
Average wages for employees. Source: ISTAT. This variable, obtained from the SECCG, is the
average of college graduate earnings (3 years after graduation) at the provincial level.
Employee-Self-employed earning ratio. Source: ISTAT. This variable, obtained from the SECCG,
is the ratio of average wages for employees and average earnings from entrepreneurship.
Unemployment rate. Source: ISTAT.
Value added in 1994. Source: ISTAT.
Population size in 1921. Source: ISTAT.
18Table 1. Summary statistics
All sample Densest provinces Rest of the country
mean st.dev mean st.dev mean st.dev
employees*** 0.67 0.47 0.71 0.45 0.65 0.48
entrepreneurs*** 0.17 0.38 0.16 0.36 0.15 0.36
self-employed (except for entrepreneurs) 0.16 0.36 1100.42 436.29 1,000.75 455.19
monthly wage from entrepreneurshipy *** 1,037.00 450.95 1,089.46 449.11 995.72 448.12
Personal characteristics:
female*** 0.50 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.51 0.50
married*** 0.19 0.39 0.17 0.38 0.20 0.40
age*** 29.57 2.01 29.42 1.94 29.65 2.03
Ph.D. degree 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.05
number of siblings* 1.25 0.88 1.23 0.86 1.26 0.89
High school characteristics:
Lyceum*** 0.64 0.48 0.69 0.46 0.61 0.49
teachers' training school*** 0.05 0.21 0.03 0.18 0.05 0.23
school for surveyors *** 0.28 0.45 0.25 0.43 0.30 0.46
vocational school 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.18
Type of degree:
chemistry-pharmaceutical*** 0.07 0.25 0.05 0.23 0.08 0.27
biology and geology*** 0.05 0.22 0.04 0.20 0.05 0.23
science*** 0.06 0.24 0.07 0.25 0.06 0.24
medicine*** 0.04 0.20 0.03 0.18 0.04 0.21
engineering*** 0.19 0.40 0.22 0.41 0.19 0.39
architecture 0.05 0.22 0.05 0.22 0.05 0.21
agriculture*** 0.03 0.16 0.02 0.14 0.03 0.17
economics and statistics*** 0.19 0.39 0.22 0.41 0.18 0.38
political and social science *** 0.06 0.24 0.07 0.26 0.05 0.22
law*** 0.08 0.27 0.07 0.26 0.08 0.27
humanities*** 0.07 0.25 0.06 0.23 0.07 0.26
foreign languages*** 0.05 0.22 0.05 0.21 0.05 0.23
teaching*** 0.03 0.17 0.02 0.14 0.03 0.18
psychology** 0.03 0.16 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.16
Father's education
primary education*** 0.17 0.38 0.13 0.34 0.20 0.40
middle school*** 0.24 0.43 0.22 0.42 0.26 0.44
high school*** 0.36 0.48 0.39 0.49 0.34 0.47
college degree*** 0.22 0.41 0.25 0.43 0.20 0.40
Mother's education
primary education*** 0.23 0.42 0.18 0.38 0.26 0.44
middle school*** 0.27 0.45 0.26 0.44 0.28 0.45
high school*** 0.35 0.48 0.38 0.49 0.33 0.47
college degree*** 0.15 0.35 0.17 0.38 0.13 0.34
Parents' occupational status
self-employed father*** 0.08 0.27 0.08 0.28 0.07 0.26
self-employed mother*** 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.09
Ability proxies:
nal grade at college*** 103.01 7.04 102.81 7.30 103.18 6.84
laude 0.21 0.40 0.21 0.41 0.20 0.40
graduated on time*** 0.15 0.36 0.16 0.37 0.15 0.35
While studying:
worked occasionally *** 0.51 0.50 0.54 0.50 0.51 0.50
worked continuously*** 0.08 0.27 0.09 0.28 0.07 0.26
never worked*** 0.41 0.49 0.38 0.48 0.43 0.49
family network*** 0.68 0.46 0.60 0.49 0.72 0.45
Sector of work
chemical sector** 0.07 0.25 0.06 0.24 0.07 0.25
machinery*** 0.04 0.19 0.06 0.24 0.03 0.16
constructions*** 0.07 0.26 0.08 0.28 0.07 0.25
other industrial sectors*** 0.18 0.38 0.19 0.39 0.17 0.37
trade and hotels*** 0.07 0.26 0.11 0.31 0.05 0.23
transportation, tours, postal services and telecommunications*** 0.10 0.30 0.07 0.26 0.11 0.32
credit and insurance*** 0.10 0.30 0.08 0.27 0.11 0.31
other professional and consulting activities*** 0.09 0.29 0.08 0.27 0.09 0.29
informatics and similar activities 0.06 0.23 0.05 0.23 0.06 0.23
education and training 0.05 0.22 0.05 0.23 0.05 0.22
health and social assistance*** 0.07 0.26 0.06 0.24 0.08 0.27
public administration*** 0.03 0.16 0.02 0.13 0.03 0.17
other social services 0.08 0.27 0.08 0.27 0.08 0.27
experience in months*** 23.61 11.97 23.95 11.95 23.61 11.97
1998*** 0.27 0.44 0.25 0.43 0.28 0.45
2001*** 0.36 0.48 0.36 0.48 0.33 0.47
2004 0.37 0.48 0.37 0.48 0.37 0.48
Characteristics of the province of work:z
population density*** 2.43 3.30 8.97 7.24 1.65 0.82
unemployment rate 9.20 7.42 7.05 6.79 9.45 7.49
value added (in 1994) 20.69 8.20 23.72 5.68 20.33 8.40
share of self-employed workers in the individual's sector*** 0.15 0.02 0.18 0.02 0.15 0.02
house prices per square metre*** 3,896.44 1,259.61 4,858.33 1,883.30 3,781.43 1,124.02
share of local bank counters in total counters* 0.39 0.19 0.29 0.15 0.40 0.19
tradition of political autonomy 0.49 0.50 0.55 0.52 0.48 0.50
collective action propensity -0.01 1.00 0.40 0.91 -0.06 1.00
blood donation 28.39 21.33 29.57 21.63 28.25 21.41
number of associations per 100,000 inhabitants (in 1985) 30.47 20.86 31.96 15.32 30.29 21.49
welfare index 105.05 30.76 105.99 27.68 104.93 31.25
voter turnover at 1946-1989 referenda* 80.14 8.27 84.30 7.77 79.64 8.23
share of municipalities with city sewer system 98.30 7.05 96.43 9.89 98.52 6.67
employee-self-employed earning ratio (in log) 1.01 0.02 1.00 0.01 1.01 0.02
average wages of employees (in log) 1.87 0.06 1.88 0.05 1.87 0.06
TOTAL 33,740 14,806 18,934
Note: Computed on employed individuals. Variables denoted with * (**) [***] indicate that the dierence between the most densely
populated provinces and the rest of the country is statistical signicant at the 10 (5) [1] percent level. The provinces in top 10th
percentile of the population density distribution (i.e., having more than 383,437 inhabitants per squared kilometre), dened as the
densest provinces, are: Naples, Milan, Trieste, Rome, Varese, Prato, Rimini, Genoa, Como, Padova and Lecco. y Computed on
4,533 individuals (i.e, the entrepreneurs). z Provincial characteristics have been computed on the universe of provinces. ? Per 100
inhabitants per squared kilometre. See the Appendix for a detailed description of the provincial variables.Table 2: Urbanization eect on the probability of being entrepreneur (marginal eects)
2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5
population density (in log) -0.0300*** -0.0261*** -0.0273*** -0.0213*** -0.0216***
(0.0041) (0.0034) (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0032)
female -0.0661*** -0.0611*** -0.0591*** -0.0578*** -0.0577***
(0.0064) (0.0034) (0.0035) (0.0033) (0.0032)
married 0.003 0.0122** 0.0123** 0.0127** 0.0148***
(0.0057) (0.0050) (0.0051) (0.0050) (0.0045)
age -0.0699*** -0.0466** -0.0389** -0.0356* -0.0297*
(0.0212) (0.0198) (0.0197) (0.0189) (0.0152)
age squared 0.0013*** 0.0008** 0.0007** 0.0007** 0.0005**
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Ph.D. degree -0.0054 -0.0385 -0.0354 -0.0383 -0.0125
(0.0406) (0.0307) (0.0317) (0.0299) (0.0302)
number of siblings 0.0015 -0.0001 -0.0009 0.0033 0.0018
(0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0022) (0.0022)
High school characteristics: lyceum omitted
teachers' training school -0.0399*** -0.0327*** -0.0334*** -0.0168*
(0.0103) (0.0110) (0.0109) (0.0101)
school for surveyors -0.007 0.0038 0.0018 -0.0031
(0.0049) (0.0048) (0.0049) (0.0044)
vocational school 0.0114 0.0240** 0.0197* 0.0209**
(0.0104) (0.0114) (0.0115) (0.0105)
Father's education: primary education omitted
middle school 0.0069 0.0068 0.0108*
(0.0069) (0.0067) (0.0064)
high school 0.0051 0.0035 0.0071
(0.0077) (0.0076) (0.0069)
college degree 0.0242** 0.0205** 0.0143
(0.0106) (0.0096) (0.0087)
Mother's education: primary education omitted
middle school 0.0072 0.0049 0.0047
(0.0058) (0.0057) (0.0054)
high school 0.0144** 0.0133** 0.0098*
(0.0066) (0.0066) (0.0055)
college degree 0.0081 0.0086 0.0069
(0.0086) (0.0085) (0.0082)
Parents' occupational status
self-employed father 0.0934*** 0.0860*** 0.0559***
(0.0074) (0.0073) (0.0068)
self-employed mother 0.0377** 0.0368* 0.0194
(0.0188) (0.0192) (0.0160)
Ability proxies:
nal grade at college 0.0095 -0.0007
(0.0075) (0.0062)




graduated on time 0.0130** 0.0115**
(0.0051) (0.0045)
While studying: never worked omitted
worked occasionally -0.0184*** -0.0169***
(0.0039) (0.0035)
worked continuously -0.0067 -0.0098*
(0.0065) (0.0056)
family network 0.0766*** 0.0565***
(0.0067) (0.0041)
experience in months 0.0017***
(0.0002)
Survey year YES YES YES YES YES
Region dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Type of degree YES YES YES YES YES
Sector of work NO NO NO NO YES
Observations 33,740 33,740 33,740 33,740 33,740
Note: White-robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the provincial level are reported in paren-
theses. The type of degree categories include: chemistry-pharmaceutical, biology and geology, medicine,
science, engineering, architecture, agriculture, political and social science, law, humanities, foreign lan-
guages, teaching, and psychology (economics and statistics omitted). The sector categories include: dis-
tribution services, hotels and restaurants; transport, travel and communication services; nancial services;
professional services (legal and architectural services, consultancies, market research, public opinion polling
services, real estate services, rental/leasing services, advertising and research and development); computer
and related services; educational services; health related and social services; public administration; chem-
icals, drugs and pharmaceuticals; engineering industry, machinery and equipment; other industries; and
construction (other public, social and personal services omitted). Omitted region: Piedmont. Symbols:
The asterisk * (**) [***] indicates statistical signicance at the 10 (5) [1] percent level.
20Table 3: Instrumental variables estimates of the urbanization eect on the probability of being entrepreneur
3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5
population density (in log) -0.0318*** -0.0261*** -0.0272*** -0.0209*** -0.0243***
(0.0041) (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0039) (0.0037)
Instruments
population density in 1921 (in log) 1.1895*** 1.1882*** 1.1880*** 1.1867*** 1.18461***
(0.0440) (0.0438) (0.0438) (0.0437) (0.0436)
Partial R-squared of excluded instruments: 0.8999 0.8994 0.8991 0.8979 0.8970
Test of excluded instruments (F-test): 731.26 735.79 735.48 735.55 738.2400
Observations 33,740 33,740 33,740 33,740 33,740
Note: White-robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the provincial level are reported in parentheses. In
columns (3.1)-(3.5) we control for the same covariates as in Table 2. The asterisk * (**) [***] indicates statistical
signicance at the 10 (5) [1] percent level.
Table 4: Urbanization eect on the probability of being entrepreneur: testing alternative hypotheses (marginal eects)
4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7
population density (in log) -0.0151*** -0.0197*** -0.0176*** -0.0215*** -0.0216*** -0.0187*** -0.0094**
(0.0028) (0.0035) (0.0029) (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0037) (0.0039)
share of self-employed workers in the individual's sector -0.2979*** -0.2909***
(0.0606) (0.0601)
house price per square metrey -0.0023 -0.0019
(0.0022) (0.0022)
share of local banks in total counters 0.0516** 0.0450**
(0.0203) (0.0189)
tradition of political autonomy 0.0061 0.0043
(0.0059) (0.0052)
collective action propensity 0.0139*** 0.0132***
(0.0044) (0.0047)
blood donation 0.0001 0.0000
(0.0002) (0.0002)
no. of associations per 100,000 inhabitants (in 1985) -0.0001 -0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001)
welfare index -0.0002 -0.0002
(0.0001) (0.0001)
voter turnover at 1946-1989 referenda 0.0012 0.0016
(0.0010) (0.0010)
share of municipalities with city sewer system 0.0002 0.0002
(0.0002) (0.0003)
average employees wages (in log)z -0.0214 -0.0093
(0.0384) (0.0398)
employees/self-employed earning ratio (in log)z -0.071 -0.0263
(0.0800) (0.0825)
unemployment rate -0.0011 -0.0008
(0.0007) (0.0008)
value added (in 1994) -0.0004 0.0001
(0.0003) (0.0003)
Observations 33,740 33,740 33,740 33,737 33,737 33,737 33,737
Note: White-robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the provincial level are reported in parentheses. y Coecient multiplied by 100. z Averages
computed by province and year. In all the columns we control for the same covariates as in specication (2.5) (Table 2). For a detailed explanation of the
provincial variables, see the Appendix. The asterisk * (**) [***] indicates statistical signicance at the 10 (5) [1] percent level.
21Table 5: Urbanization eect on log monthly earnings from entrepreneurship
5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.6
PANEL A: OLS
population density (in log) 0.0230** 0.0295*** 0.0275*** 0.0201* 0.0181*
(0.0103) (0.0105) (0.0104) (0.0104) (0.0102)
PANEL B: IV
density (in log) 0.0231** 0.0280*** 0.0260*** 0.0187* 0.0168*
(0.0101) (0.0098) (0.0097) (0.0097) (0.0096)
First stage - Instruments
Population density in 1921 (in log) 1.1796*** 1.1780*** 1.1775*** 1.1762*** 1.1764***
(0.0411) (0.0408) (0.0407) (0.0407) (0.0406)
Partial R-squared of excluded instruments: 0.8976 0.8967 0.8964 0.8954 0.8953
Test of excluded instruments (F-test): 822.31 833.58 834.66 835.64 841.23
Observations 4,533 4,533 4,533 4,533 4,533
Note: White-robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the provincial level are reported in parentheses. OLS coecients are
marginal eects. In columns (5.1)-(5.5) we control for the same covariates as in Table 2. The asterisk * (**) [***] indicates statistical
signicance at the 10 (5) [1] percent level.
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